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Abstract. The aim of eSTREAM Profile II is to identify a small number
of stream ciphers that are suitable for low resource circuitry based im-
plementation. Besides algorithmic properties and security evaluation to
theoretical attacks, performance evaluation is another important task of
eSTREAM that is being considered. In this contribution we summarize
and explain our testing framework for eSTREAM Profile II candidates
regarding hardware implementations.
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1 Introduction
The main motivation of the eSTREAM project is to identify stream ciphers
that can be used as replacements for AES in both high throughput software
based implementations (Profile I) and low resource hardware (circuitry) based
implementations (Profile II).
Whereas the approach undertaken for performance testing of Profile I can-
didates is well known, detailed test plans for Profile II candidates have not been
presented, yet. Our contribution encourages an open approach for this frame-
work. This work is produced by the VAMPIRE lab as part of the ECRYPT
project.
2 Performance Criteria for Profile II Candidates
? The work described in this paper has been supported in part by the European Com-
mission through the IST Programme under Contract IST-2002-507932 ECRYPT, the
European Network of Excellence in Cryptology. KUL researchers are also supported
by FWO projects (G.0141.03, G.0450.04), GOA Mefisto 2000/06, GOA Ambiorix
2005/11.
The primary aim of eSTREAM Profile II is to find stream ciphers that require
lower resources that an AES implementation in circuitry yielding at least the
same throughput as an AES implementation. For evaluating the performance of
Profile II candidates we consider the categories
1. Compactness (Area),
2. Performance (Throughput),
3. Power Consumption,
4. Flexibility/Scalability/Pipelining and
5. Simplicity/Completeness/Clarity
Each test category is explained in more detail below.
Our main approach is to consider the possible trade-offs between these cate-
gories. Among them, compactness and performance are the most important ones
and a trade-off metric for compactness and performance is preferable. We men-
tion also a firm requirement for a low power consumption, which is of crucial
importance for wireless applications such as PDAs, mobile phones, RFIDs etc.
We especially compare with current AES implementation benchmarks (see
Section 3). Candidates which are not able to outperform AES implementations
in terms of compactness and performance can probably not be advanced further
in the eSTREAM Profile II project. Secondary, we compare among eSTREAM
candidates. An open question is whether the value of versatile algorithms that
are proposed for both Profile I and Profile II is considered differently than pure
Profile II submissions.
Note that the most important criterium for analysis of eSTREAM, i.e., math-
ematical security of the algorithm, is not evaluated as part of this framework.
2.1 Compactness (Area)
For the hardware oriented stream ciphers, the silicon area determines the cost of
the implementation. This feature is one of the first to be taken into consideration,
because the main goal of stream ciphers is to be smaller than block ciphers. That
is why the area of the proposed stream ciphers should be compared to the area
of a compact AES implementation. The benchmarks that can be used for this
comparison are described in Sect. 3.
2.2 Performance (Throughput)
The properties that are taken into account when evaluating the performance of
the stream cipher implementation are frequency, bits per second (throughput)
and bits per cycle. Performance is, together with area, one of the most important
design criteria. In Sect. 3 performance benchmarks are given for area constrained
AES implementations.
2.3 Power Consumption
As stream ciphers are used in small handheld devices, power consumption should
be taken into account to estimate the battery’s capabilities. However, estimating
the power consumption of a design is not straightforward. Power estimation tools
such as SPICE can help for this matter, but are not always reliable especially
without back-annotating physical layout information.
2.4 Flexibility/Scalability/Pipelining
The flexibility of a stream cipher is determined by the variety of possible imple-
mentation options. A high flexibility usually results in a large design parameter
space with area and performance as the two main dimensions: implementations
can be optimized for speed or for area or the design criterium can be a trade-off
of these two. By scalability we mean the ability to scale the design with respect
to the width of the data path. This results again in a trade-off between area and
speed. Inserting registers for pipelining allows to increase the frequency and the
throughput of the implementation.
These criteria do not only consider the inherent flexibility/scalability/pipelining
of the design stressed by the author, but also possibilities to realize these prop-
erties detected by the implementer.
2.5 Simplicity/Completeness/Clarity
Because the new stream cipher standard will be adopted in many applications,
the description should be clear. More specific, all details needed for the imple-
mentation should be given in the describing document. To decrease the non-
recurring engineering time, a simple description is preferred. Some stream ci-
phers are more simple by nature and therefore allow a more simple description.
However, even the more complicated stream ciphers should be introduced in an
illustrative manner. That is why the new stream ciphers should be evaluated on
simplicity, completeness and clarity of the describing document.
3 AES Hardware Implementation
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [11] was standardized by the Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technologies (NIST) in 2001. AES is a block
cipher that operates on 128-bit blocks of data using a 128-bit, 192-bit or 256-bit
key. The most common key size is 128-bit and is solely considered in this testing
framework. For a complete specification of AES we refer to [11].
A recent report with a strong focus on AES hardware architectures can be
found in [5]. For the purpose of this testing framework, the lightweight imple-
mentations of [5] are the most important ones.
Most of the previous work on compact AES implementations outlines bench-
marks for either ASIC or FPGA implementations. Here, we aim to give both
benchmarks for ASIC and FPGA implementations as FPGAs have attracted
more attention in the last years. Therefore, we selected two reference implemen-
tations for both ASIC and FPGA implementations.
For ASIC implementations, the reference implementations are from Feldhofer
et al. [6] and Satoh et al. [14]. The former uses an 8-bit architecture and is
currently the most compact AES ASIC implementation. On the other hand the
work of Satoh et al. [14] gives results for different architectures ranging from
32-bit to 128-bit and therefore yields an increased throughput of data. In Table
1 we give the circuit benchmarks based on compactness. Both implementations
use combinatorial logic for the S-Box implementation which is more suited for
low-cost implementations than the use of a ROM table. There is also the work
of Canright [2] that evaluates all options for basis, irreducible polynomial etc. to
make the S-Box implementation even more compact in order to obtain further
optimizations.
For low-cost FPGA benchmarks we select Good/Benaissa [7] and Chodo-
wiec/Gaj [4] as references. The former is based on an 8-bit architecture, whereas
[4] uses a 32-bit architecture. Benchmarks are summarized in Table 2.
Feldhofer [6] Satoh [14] Satoh [14] Satoh [14]
Architecture 8-bit 32-bit 64-bit 128-bit
No. S-boxes 1 4 8 20
Area [GEs] 3,400 5,398 7,998 12,454
Cycles per encryption 1 1,032 54 32 11
Throughput [bits/cycle] 0.12 2.37 4.00 11.64
Technology [µm] 0.35 0.11 0.11 0.11
Clock frequency [MHz] 80 131 137 145
Throughput [Mbps] 9.9 311 548 1,691
Table 1. Benchmarks for AES-128 low-cost ASIC Implementations
Good/Benaissa [7] Chodowiec/Gaj [4]
Architecture 8-bit 32-bit
No. S-Boxes 1 4
FPGA Xilinx Spartan-II XC2S15-6 Xilinx Spartan II XC2S30-6
Slices 124 222
No. of Block RAMs 2 3
Bits of Block RAM used 4,480 9,600 [7]
Total Equiv. Slices 264 522 [7]
Clock frequency [MHz] 67 60
Throughput [Mbps] 2 2.2 69
Table 2. Benchmarks for AES-128 low-cost FPGA Implementations
1 [6] includes the key schedule. For [14], add ten cycles for the key schedule.
2 For comparison we use the definition of average throughput given by [7].
4 Performance Evaluation
The hardware performance measurements will be similar to Round 2 of AES
where different AES candidates were implemented by NSA in an unbiased way.
The design analysis consists of hardware designing (mostly based on the stream
cipher designers’ suggestions), coding in a hardware modeling language, simula-
tion and synthesis for various hardware platforms. We would be concentrating on
the low cost FPGAs and semi-custom ASIC with standard CMOS libraries. For
a fair analysis, we provide an equivalent treatment for all the ciphers with basic
optimizations that would be done during the normal hardware design phase.
This would provide a meaningful comparison between the results of various de-
signs and may be suitable only for this specific context of hardware performance
measurement.
In Section 2, we mentioned the various performance parameters that will be
considered. Since all performance parameters cannot be met in a single design, we
would have to find possible trade-offs and possibly implement multiple designs.
The flexibility of the algorithm would be the deciding factor for multiple designs.
But compiler design constraint settings like delay and area are also another way
to find various trade-off points. Our main approach will be to find designs that
have low area and medium speed. An iterative kind of algorithm would be the
standard choice for the designs.
We would be measuring the key-setup time, iv-setup time and the throughput
performance of each of the designs. Our designs will be compared with efficient
low-area implementations of AES mentioned in Section 3. Our aim would be to
find designs that would be more compact than a low-area AES design but still
faster in performance.
The different designs will be modeled using VHDL (VHSIC Hardware De-
scription Language). The designs will be implemented following the standard
methodology used by ASIC designers. This would include identifying various
sub-blocks from the algorithm that would help to implement a small area itera-
tive design. During this phase, a major deciding factor would be the algorithmic
designer’s suggestions mentioned in the specifications submitted to eSTREAM.
A different approach would be taken only if the hardware designer feels a huge
gain in performance than the one suggested. This will be followed by simula-
tion and synthesis of the design model under different area/delay constraints
to obtain the various performance measurements. The final physical layout and
fabrication for ASIC designs would be beyond the scope of this testing.
For the unbiased approach we neglect the overhead for interfacing to the
outside world by providing a standardized interfacing within each of the imple-
mentations. Though any input parameter needs that are constraining to a good
hardware design would be noted in the final results. This user interface provides
the algorithm with the key, initialization vector and the plaintext. It receives
the key stream from the algorithm and XORs it to the plaintext, providing the
ciphertext to the outside world. All other control signaling to the algorithm are
also done from a common control block.
5 Evaluation of Other Implementation Properties
Besides performance criteria, we aim to evaluate also other implementation prop-
erties of stream ciphers in Phase II.
This task consists of the test categories
1. Design Analysis,
2. Side Channel Susceptibility,
3. Fault Analysis Susceptibility and
4. Probing Susceptibility.
The task “Design Analysis” deals with possible improvements and guidance
for the final specification of the algorithms. The remaining three tasks evaluate
the susceptibility of the implementations of eStream candidates towards im-
plementation attacks. Counteracting implementation attacks typically requires
additional implementation costs which are not considered in Section 2, yet.
Each task is explained in more detail below.
5.1 Design Analysis
The other main objective of the design analysis would be to find hardware effi-
cient sub-blocks in the various algorithm. This will provide an easily identifiable
list of functions that are good for hardware design and hence enable cryptogra-
phers to design a more hardware efficient stream cipher in the future.
5.2 Side Channel Susceptibility
Here we discuss vulnerabilities of hardware implementations of stream ciphers to
side-channel attacks. It is very important to consider these already in the design
phase as from the previous work some general recommendations for the design
and countermeasures are known.
Implementation attacks in general exploit weaknesses in specific implemen-
tations of a cryptographic algorithm. Sensitive information, such as secret keys
or a plaintext can be obtained by observing some side-channel information such
as the power consumption, the electromagnetic radiation, etc.
In the 90’s Kocher et al. performed successful attacks by measuring the power
consumption while the cryptographic circuit is executing the implemented algo-
rithm [9]. The most straightforward power analysis, called Simple Power Analysis
(SPA), uses a single measurement to reveal the secret key by searching for pat-
terns in the power trace. However, implementations that are resistant against
SPA attacks, can still be broken by using a more advanced technique, namely
Differential Power Analysis (DPA). In this case many power measurements are
evaluated using statistical analysis. A similar terminology is used when the ob-
served side-channel is electromagnetic radiation. In that case typical attacks are
SEMA and DEMA.
Template attacks were invented by Chari et al. [3] and it was shown by
Rechberger [12] that they can be also a serious threat to stream ciphers as well
as all other ciphers.
From the power and electromagnetic analysis point of view there is not much
previous work done on stream ciphers. However, the work of Lano et al. consid-
ers a DPA attack on synchronous stream ciphers with resynchronization mech-
anism [10]. Hence, their conclusion should be verified for the candidates in this
class of stream ciphers. Also the work of Rechberger and Oswald [13] gives some
recommendation for stream ciphers in order to avoid simple side-channel attacks.
5.3 Fault Analysis Susceptibility
Fault analysis is an active implementation attack that aims to disturb the com-
putation of a cryptographic algorithm in such a way that an erroneous result is
obtained. By applying mathematical cryptanalysis these erroneous results can
be used to extract cryptographic key material. Reference [8] provides several
general attacks that are applicable at LFSR based stream ciphers. For RC4, two
different approaches have been presented in [1].
In this task, it is evaluated whether an eSTREAM candidate is vulnerable
against one of the general techniques of [8]. If so, the complexity of a successful
attack is estimated. Additionally, alternative approaches of fault analysis are
checked.
5.4 Probing Susceptibility
Probing is an active implementation attack that directly connects to the circuit
and allows monitoring of internal data flow.
In this task, the susceptibility of the implementation of eSTREAM candi-
dates towards probing attacks is evaluated. Our approach first identifies critical
connections within the implementation. The metric used for evaluation is the
entropy loss (of the key, respectively, of the current state) at each critical con-
nection as well as the maximum entropy loss by probing a few critical connections
simultaneously.
6 Ongoing Test Activities
Due to the number of submissions, current test activities have started first by
using the remaining candidates that are not ‘broken’ yet by mathematical anal-
ysis. After moving to Phase II it is assumed that also selected algorithms with
a tweaked version are included in Profile II performance testing.
Actually, the submissions tested at the transition to Phase II are summarized
in Table 3.
Profile I and II Profile II
Hermes8 EDON-80
NLS (2A) MICKEY / MICKEY-128
Phelix (2A) MOSQUITO
Rabbit Trivium
Salsa20 VEST (2A)
Table 3. Candidates under test for both Profile I and II candidates and Profile II
candidates (in alphabetical order).
7 Conclusion
Currently, test specifications are still in a draft state. We encourage any third-
party contributions and assessments!
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